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POWER OF COURTS TO COMPEL DEFENDANT IN
CRIMINAL CASE TO SUBMIT TO
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
SUMNER KENNER*

It is provided in Chapter 102, Acts 1927, that in a criminal
case where the defense of insanity is interposed that the court
shall appoint two or three competent disinterested physicians
to examine the defendant and testify at the trial. It is further
provided that such testimony shall follow the presentation of
the evidence for the prosecution and defense and that such
medical witness may be cross-examined by both parties and
that each side may introduce evidence in rebuttal to the testimony of such medical witnesses.
The validity of this section has been vigorously assailed by
attorneys upon the ground that it is compelling the defendant
to furnish evidence against himself in violation of the constitutional provision. The question has not been passed upon by the
courts of last resort in this state and the holdings of the lower
courts have not been harmonious, some courts upholding the
statute, while the news reports within the last week record the
granting of a new trial in a murder case on the ground that the
admission of the doctors' testimony taken under the statute was
erroneous.
Section 14 of Article 1 of the Bill of Rights provides that
"No person in any criminal prosecution shall be compelled to
testify against himself."
In view of the increasing number of murder cases wherein
insanity is pleaded as a defense, the question becomes one of
importance to the judiciary and to the attorneys, especially those
engaged in the criminal practice.
An early case in Nevada 1 is a leading case upholding the
right to such an examination. This was a murder case where
insanity was pleaded and the trial court appointed physicians
to examine defendant and allowed them to testify over defend* See page 492 for biographical note.
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ant's objection that it was in violation of his constitutional right
of not being required to testify against himself. In affirming
the case, the higher court said, "The constitution means just
what a fair and reasonable interpretation of its language imparts. No person shall be compelled to be a witness-that is, to
testify-against himself. To use the common phrase, 'it closes
the mouth' of the prisoner. A defendant in a criminal case cannot be compelled to give evidence under oath or affirmation or
make any statement for the purpose of proving or disproving
any question at issue before any tribunal, court, judge or magistrate. This is the shield under which he is protected by the
strong arm of the law, and this protection was given, not for
the purpose of evading the truth, but, as before stated, for the
reason that in the sound judgment of the-men who framed the
constitution, it was thought that, owing to the weakness of
human nature and the various motives that actuate mankind, a
defendant accused of crime might be tempted to give testimony
against himself that was not true. From whatever standpoint
this question can be considered, the truth forces itself upon my
mind that no evidence of physical fact can, upon any established
principle of law, or upon any substantial reason, be held to come
The court
within the letter or spirit of the constitution."
further held that the defendant was not compelled to exhibit
himself in such a manner as to unjustly or improperly prejudice
his case before the jury.
In the year 1924, the question was before the Supreme Court
of West Virginia. 2 Defendant therein complained of the
evidence of a physician to whose office the defendant was
brought handcuffed several days before the trial by the prosecuting attorney and several officers from the penitentiary, without
notice to his attorneys, and without his consent. The doctor
made an X-ray examination of the defendant's skull and testified
relative thereto at the trial. Defendant contended that such
evidence was not proper for the reason that such examination
without his consent, violated his constitutional right not to be
compelled to give evidence against himself. In holding that the
evidence was properly admitted, Justice Litz, speaking for the
court, said:
"Ordinarily the result of a physical examination made without consent
of the accused is not admissible in evidence, but we find the weight of
2 State v. Colem,

(W. V.) 123 S. E. 580.
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authority in this country to be to the effect, that where the defense of
insanity is made, evidence of the facts disclosed by a physical and mental
examination of accused by physicians either prior to or during the trial,
with or without his consent, does not violate the constitutional privilege
of accused not to be a witness against himself. It is further held that
neither does such examination violate the constitutional relations of physician and patient."
In a New York case8 the court said:
"The only exceptions taken by the defendant that are urged before
us relate to the examination of the defendant by Dr. Flint during one of
the adjournments of the court, while the defendant was on trial, and
also to the subsequent testimony of Dr. Flint, in which he related to the
jury the conversation which he had with the defendant, and described what
he found upon a physical examination. It is claimed on behalf of the
defendant that such examination was obtained by entrapping the defendant, and that it was generally unfair and prejudicial to him, and that he
was thereby compelled to give testimony against himself in violation of
his constitutional rights

.

.

.

The defendant was distinctly told that he

might decline to answer any quettions that were put to him, and that anything that he said in answer to questions might be used against him . .
The record does not disclose any justification for the claim that Dr.
Flint was used to entrap the defendant into making a statement for use
against him on the trial. There is no denial of the testimony that Dr.
Flint examined the defendant after being told that it was requested by the
court, and that the examination was made without the knowledge or
presence of either counsel.

.

.

.

The statement made to Dr. Flint was

not within the constitutional prohibition against compelling a defendant
to give testimony against himself."
In a Missouri case 4 the court said:
"The point is made that error was committed in allowing certain
physicians to visit the jail and examine the defendant and then give evidence for the state as to his mental condition. But we are unable to agree
to this contention. The defendant made no objection to the examination,
but submitted to it."
The court then quotes from a New York case as follows:
"The
to make
ordinary
and was

practice of allowing the experts for the people and the defense
examinations of the prisoner, as to his mental condition, is the
procedure in cases where the defense of insanity is interposed,
resorted to in this case by defendant's counsel."

a People v. Furlong, 187 N. Y. 198, 79 N. E. 978.
4 State 'v. Church, (Mo.) 98 S. W. 16.
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The court then concludes that,
"under such circumstances a witness may be sent to examine him while
5
in jail as to his mental condition"

The Supreme Court of Washington has quoted with approval
the rule as laid down in the New York cases 6 and has held that
it was not error for a physiciian to testify as to the condition of
a defendant, based upon an examination made in jail at the request of the prosecuting attorney, but without the knowledge or
consent of the defendant's attorneys. The court points out that
the physicians were not questioned on the stand as to any conversations with defendant or as to the transactions in the jail,
their testimony being simply their opinion of his mental condition as they saw him in his cell and in the court room, but they
gave no evidence of his statements, or of his physical condition.
In New Jersey 7 it was held that notwithstanding the rule of
the common law that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself (there being no such constitutional provision in force in New Jersey), a physician who made an examination of the defendant could testify as to wounds found on
the back of defendant's hands, and that it was immaterial that
prior to making the examination the physician required the
defendant to strip; and it was further suggested that even if the
wounds had been disclosed only after the removal of the defendant's clothing, the testimony of the physician as to their existence would nevertheless have been admissible. Of this the court
said:
"If the wound were upon the face or hand, or a part of his person exposed to common view, it would be absurd to say that testimony of what
the wound presented to common observation was compelling a person on
whom the wound was to be a witness against himself. I think it is
equally absurd to say that the testimony of the observation of a wound in
any part of the body, although obtained by a forcible removal of what concealed it, is to be rejected as produced by compelling a person to be a
witness against himself. There are cases which carry the protection of
the accused under such constitutional restrictions to an extent which
seems unwarranted."
GSee People v. Glover (Mich.) 38 N. W. 874; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence,
(16th ed.) Sec. 469-E.
6 State v. Spangler, 92 Wash. 636, 159 Pac. 810, citing People V. Kemmler, 119 N. Y. 580, 24 N. E. 9.
7 State v. Miller, 71 N. J. L. 527, 60 Atl. 202.
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Although the Indiana courts have not passed upon the exact
question as presented by the validity of the Act of 1927, yet our
court has passed upon and upheld the introduction of evidence
obtained in such a manner as the defendant claimed was causing
him to testify against himself.
In the case of O'Brien v. States it appeared that the defendant
had been confined in jail in another state and that when witnesses arrived for the purpose of identifying him they requested
permission to make an examination of his body for certain
marks or scars. The request being refused, the prisoner was
handcuffed and the proposed examination was made forcibly and
against his will. On the trial witnesses proposed to testify as to
the marks and scars found by them, and it was objected that
the testimony was within the inhibition found in Article 1, Section 14 of the State Constitution, which has been quoted earlier
in this article. In holding that the testimony was admissible
the court said:
"The question of duress and its effect upon information thereby obtained is not involved, because the facts to which the witness was called
to testify did not depend upon a confession made by the appellant, nor
upon any act of his; the marks and scars upon the body had no relation
to the force used to enable the witness to find them. The case is much
like the examination of a person under arrest, for concealed weapons
with which he could have committed the crime of murder of which he is
accused. . . . and the right to examine the person of the accused for
such purpose has never been questioned. The conclusion can be reached
that the offered testimony was within the constitutional prohibition only
upon the theory that the witness was the mere mouthpiece, and that the
appellant was the real witness, which would be a strained construction of
the constitutional provision when applied to the offered testimony."

In a recent Utah case a somewhat similar question was presented, although the physician's evidence was chiefly based upon
the facts stated in a hypothetical question. 9 In holding the testimony competent, the court said:
"It certainly would be a strange doctrine to permit one charged with a
public offense to put in issue his want of mental capacity to commit the
offense, and in order to make his plea of want of capacity invulnerable
prevent all inquiry into his mental state or condition."
8 O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 25 N. E. 137, 9 L. R. A. 323.
9 State v. Cerar (Utah) 207 Pac. 597.
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In 16 C. J. 568, the rule is stated as follows:
"Where the defense interposed is insanity, evidence of the facts disclosed at a physical and mental examination of accused by physicians,
either prior to the trial or during an adjournment of the court while the
trial is in progress, does not violate the constitutional privilege of accused
not to be a witness against himself." 10

On the other hand, the power to compel the defendant in a
criminal case to submit to a physical examination by a physician
or other person, and the admissibility in evidence of the examiner's testimony as to the facts learned by him by means of such
examination have been denied in a number of jurisdictions
where the question has arisen, on the ground that to compel
such an examination would constitute a violation of the constitutional provision that the defendant in a criminal prosecution
shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, and that the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, homes, papers and effects against unreasonable
seizures and searches shall not be violated.
In an Iowa case, 1 the defendant was charged with rape on a
female under the age of consent. The prosecutrix was found to
have a venereal disease, and for the purpose of showing that the
defendant was afflicted with the same disease, physicians were
called who made an examination of defendant while he was confined in jail, and later testified at the trial. In holding that the
admission of such evidence was error, the court said:
"It would seem, therefore, that such an investigation as that made in
the case before us is without authority as against defendant's objections,
and the receipt of the evidence was error, on the ground that it was the
result of the invasion of defendant's constitutional right, impliedly guaranteed under the provisions of our constitution as to due process of law,
not to criminate himself."
10 See 8 RI. C. L. pp. 78-79, also Comm. v. Buccieri, (Pa.) 26 Atl. 228.
See note to 16 A. L. R. page 371 citing cases holding that the constitutional provision is not violated by the introduction in evidence of photographs of finger prints. See also, State v. Garrett, 71 N. C. 85, 17 Am.
Rep. 1.
11 State v. Height, 117 Ia. 650, 91 N. W. 935, 94 Am. St. Rep. 323.
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The court further held that there had been a violation of defendant's constitutional rights against unlawful search of
person.
In a Missouri case, 12 which was a rape case, there was an
examination of the person of defendant in jail by a physician
and in the presence of the sheriff, who testified as to the result
of such examination and as to what was said.
On appeal the cause was reversed for error in allowing the
examination and in admitting the evidence as to same. The
court held that defendant had not in fact consented to the examination and that it was a violation of his constitutional right to
be exempt from testifying against himself.
In another Missouri case 13 where the testimony of the defendant given under compulsion at the coroner's inquest was held
inadmissible against him, the testimony of the physician as to
the result of his examination of the defendant's person was
excluded.
In an early New York case'4 defendant was charged with the
murder of her child immediately after its birth. At the instance
of the coroner, two physicians visited the jail for the purpose of
determining whether the defendant had recently given birth to
a child. The defendant was told that if she did not submit to
the examination, force would be used to effect it, and she in consequence made no resistance. The trial court ruled that the
opinion of the physician formed as the result of such examination was inadmissible, in that the examination so held was a violation of defendant's constitutional right against testifying
about herself.
In an English case 15 it was held that a magistrate was liable
for ordering the physical examination of a woman prisoner
charged with concealing the birth of a child.
From a somewhat careful review of the authorities, the following deductions might be made:
(1) The Indiana law authorizing the examination of a defendant entering a plea of insanity is valid.
(2) The testimony of a physician as to facts learned from
such an examination is not a violation of the constitutional right
given a defendant as to testifying against himself.
12 State v. Newcomb, 220 Mo. 54, 119 S. W. 405. See also as to the
rule in Missouri, State v. Young, 119 Mo. 495, 98 S. W. 16.
'3 State v. Young, 119 Mo. 495, 24 S. W. 1038.
14 People v. McCoy, 45 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 216.
15 Agnew v. Jobson, 13 Cox C. C. (Eng.) 625, 19 Moak 612.
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(3)
The 1927 act is broad enough so that the court making
the order as to the examination can protect the defendant from
any indecent or offensive examination of his person and from
compelling him to exhibit himself in such a manner as to unjustly and improperly prejudice his case before the jury.
(4) The constitutional provision would not apply where the
defendant consents to the examination 1 6 or voluntarily submits
thereto.
16 Where defendants voluntarily submit to examination, see Gordow v.
State, 68 Ga. 814; Thomas v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 607, 28 S. W. 534; People
v. Gloves, 71 Mich. 303, 38 N. W. 874; State v. Jones, 153 Mo. 457, 55 S.
W. 80. Note to Am. Cas. 1912 D, page 227. Under the Indiana decisions
the evidence of physicians as to their examination of a defendant on order
of court would not be privileged. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gorman, 47 App.
432; Miller v. Miller, 47 App. 239; Bower v. Bower, 142 Ind. 194.

